Ostensive gestures come first: their role in the beginning of shared reference

Abstract

In developmental Psychology pointing gestures are widely accepted as the gesture that par excellence allows shared reference (Cyrulnik, 2002; Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano & Tomasello, 2006), the basic form of gestural reference (Leavens, Hopkins & Bard, 2008; Pika, 2008). Whereas in semiotics, ostensive gestures are the first instance of active signification where the object occupies a prominent place as an instrument of communication (Eco, 1976). In this paper, from the pragmatics of the object perspective (Rodríguez & Moro 1998), we argue that not pointing but ostensive gestures come first. We postulate that the emphasis on pointing gestures as the prototype of shared reference is related to (1) The difficulty in accepting that ostensive gestures are gestures (2) A developmental understanding of gestures is needed. Children understand and produce ostensive gestures before pointing gestures, and adults produce ostensive gestures with objects in a shared space with the child since a very early age long before pointing gestures (3) A theoretical and pragmatic conceptualization of objects beyond their “physical” level. Objects are cultural products with public functions; as a consequence, objects are also powerful instruments of communication between people, especially during the first years of life, and not simply the setting that surrounds the communicative niche. Finally, we discuss the implications of these notions for developmental psychology, going beyond the declarative and imperative functions. We discuss three new functions of ostensive gestures: (1) for oneself with an exploratory or/and contemplative function, (2) private with a self-regulatory function, and (3) interrogative.