García Díaz, AntónHernán González, RobertoKujal, Praveen2013-11-272013-11-272009García-Díaz, A., Hernán-González, R., & Kujal, P. (2009). List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27(6), 719-727.01677187http://hdl.handle.net/11268/359List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage. We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.engList PricingDiscountsCapacity Constrained ModelsMixed StrategiesPure StrategiesStackelberg LeaderOnline Book IndustryCapacity LimitationJudo EconomicsSettingFirmsLarge MarketsCompetitionEquilibriaDispersionModelStrategiesBusiness & Economicsjournal article10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.03.002restricted accessGestión industrialPolítica de precios